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I. INTRODUCTION 
For decades, employee benefit plans have provided financial 
security and accessible capital during retirement for laborers worldwide.  
The United States first introduced its large-scale pension plans in the 
wake of the Civil War.1  Due to the leadership of various labor unions in 
the decades following the war, many state and local governments, as well 
as private corporations, established such plans for their employees.2  As 
of 2007, approximately 124 million employees maintained retirement 
plans.3 
By the end of the twentieth century, the growth of employee 
retirement benefit plans caused an increase in claims of abuse regarding 
employer compliance.4  In response, regulation attempts began at the 
state and local levels. 5   In 1974, however, the federal government 
stepped in with a comprehensive system of regulation entitled the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”).6  This statute 
establishes disclosure requirements and puts in place systematic 
enforcement mechanisms to ensure uniformity and consistency.7 
ERISA establishes various reporting and disclosure requirements in 
accordance with its stated policy to increase the likelihood that 
participants and beneficiaries under employer-provided pension plans 
will receive their full benefits.8  The administrator of each employee 
benefit plan must furnish9  to each plan participant and beneficiary a 
                                                                                                             
 1 Justin Cummins & Meg Luger Nikolai, ERISA Reform in a Post-Enron World, 39 
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 563, 563 (2006). 
 2 Id. 
 3 U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN. PRIVATE PENSION PLAN 
BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS (2010), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2007pensionplanbulletin.PDF. 
 4 S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 3 (1973). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006). 
 7 See supra note 4, at 1–2. 
 8 29 U.S.C. § 1001b(c)(3) (2006). 
 9 See 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (2006).  In conjunction with certain required timeframes 
within which the plan administrator must furnish information to the plan participants and 
beneficiaries, the administrator is also required to furnish such information as may be 
received, in the form of a written request, by the participant or beneficiary.  Id. 
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summary of the plan description10 and pension benefit statements11 at 
designated intervals. 12    Plan administrators must also file reports, 
including publicly accessible financial and actuarial statements along 
with opinions issued by independent qualified specialists.13  In addition 
to the mandatory disclosure requirements, ERISA permits the Secretary 
of Labor14 to issue regulations establishing further responsibilities for 
plan administrators.  For example, the Secretary may require, by 
regulation or otherwise, 15  that the administrator furnish to each 
participant and beneficiary a statement of his or her rights. 16   The 
comprehensive duty to disclose, together with the reporting requirements 
enumerated in section 1021, are indicative of the extensive responsibility 
endowed upon plan administrators and of Congress’s desire to ensure 
that the interested parties are well informed. 
ERISA also establishes certain participation and vesting 
requirements.  For example, an employer may not condition participation 
in the plan on an employee’s completion of a term of service extending 
beyond either the later of one year of service, or the employee’s twenty-
first birthday.17  Each pension plan must provide that an employee’s 
rights to his normal retirement benefits, his own contributions, and one 
hundred percent of his employer’s contributions after a certain period of 
service, are nonforfeitable18 upon the attainment of normal retirement 
                                                                                                             
 10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1022(a) (2006).  Each plan must include the required information 
specified in § 1022(b) and must be written, “in a manner calculated to be understood by 
the average plan participant, and shall be sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to 
reasonably apprise such participants and beneficiaries of their rights and obligations 
under the plan.”  Id. 
 11 The statements shall include: the total benefits accrued and the nonforfeitable 
pension benefits.  It shall be written in a manner calculated to be understood by the 
average plan participant, and may be delivered in any appropriate form so long as it is 
reasonably accessible to the participant or beneficiary.  See § 1025(a)(1)(B)(ii)(2) (2006). 
 12 See 29 U.S.C. § 1025 (2006). 
 13 29 U.S.C. § 1026 (2006). 
 14 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006). This section explains the dual enforcement 
responsibilities of the Secretary of Labor and the Secretary of Treasury.  For example, the 
Department of Treasury has statutory authority for minimum standards—funding, 
participation and vesting of benefit rights.  Id.  The Department of Labor will have 
statutory authority for fiduciary obligations and veto power over any Treasury decisions 
that significantly affect collectively bargained plans.  Id.  The Treasury has the authority 
to audit plans and levy tax penalties, while the Department of Labor maintains the 
authority to bring a civil action against plans and plan fiduciaries.  Id. 
 15 29 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006). 
 16 29 U.S.C. § 1024(c) (2006). 
 17 See 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
 18 “Nonforfeitable” is defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002 as: “[A] claim obtained by a 
participant or his beneficiary to that part of an immediate or deferred benefit under a 
pension plan which arises from the participant’s service, which is unconditional, and 
which is legally enforceable against the plan.”  Id. 
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age.19  Additionally, ERISA establishes certain accrual requirements,20 
minimum funding standards,21 and the manner and method of benefit 
payments.22 
Most importantly, in order to secure proper compliance with 
ERISA’s requirements, Congress established plan fiduciaries, whose 
exclusive purpose is to discharge their duties for the benefit of the 
participants and beneficiaries.23  These fiduciaries must act with the same 
degree of care that a “prudent man” would, if he or she acted in similar 
circumstances.24  In addition, a fiduciary is liable for any breach of other 
fiduciaries’ responsibilities: (1) if he knowingly participates or conceals 
any act or omission of another fiduciary, (2) if he enables such other 
fiduciary to commit a breach, or (3) if he has knowledge of a breach by 
another fiduciary and makes no effort to remedy it.25   If a fiduciary 
breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed by 
ERISA, then he is personally liable to such plan for any losses resulting 
from the breach, any profits made through the use of plan assets, and any 
other equitable relief necessary.26  Conscious of public policy concerns, 
section 1110 similarly imposes strong burdens on fiduciaries by voiding 
any provision in an agreement or any other instrument that purports to 
relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any obligation or 
duty established under ERISA.27 
To further promote its compliance scheme and foster adherence to 
the substantive provisions of the Act, ERISA includes a provision 
protecting individuals against retaliation.28  The antiretaliation provision 
of ERISA—section 51029—prohibits an employer from discriminating 
against an employee who has “given information or has testified or is 
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to [ERISA.]”30  
Similarly, section 510 prohibits the use of coercive interference in the 
                                                                                                             
 19 See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a) (2006). 
 20 See 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2006). 
 21 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–1085 (2006). 
 22 29 U.S.C. § 1056 (2006). 
 23 29 U.S.C. § 1104 (2006). 
 24 Id. 
 25 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (2006). 
 26 29 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006). 
 27 29 U.S.C. § 1110 (2006). 
 28 Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d 121, 124 (3d Cir. 1987) (analyzing the 
antiretaliation and enforcement mechanisms in the FLSA in order to create an 
environment fostering compliance with the substantive provisions of that Act). 
 29 Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006), this provision is referred to as “section 510” 
because it falls within part five, section 510 of the act in its original form.  See Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. 
 30 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
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exercise of any right to which a participant or beneficiary is entitled, or 
may become entitled.31 
In practice, this statutory definition has elicited varying 
interpretations as to which employees are protected under section 510; 
the controversy is based on the form of the information that employees 
provide with respect to ERISA violations.  On one end of the spectrum 
are employees who give information during the course of a formal 
administrative or agency investigation, or during litigation.  Section 510 
undoubtedly protects these employees.  At the other end of the spectrum 
are the employees who, of their own volition, provide information to 
their employers regarding perceived violations of ERISA.  In the middle 
of the spectrum are the employees who report violations after their 
employers solicit them for such information. 
The two latter categories of employees are the subject of a current 
circuit split that focuses upon their rights and protections under section 
510.  The Third and Fourth Circuits held that section 510 does not 
protect employees who make internal complaints, regardless of form.32  
By contrast, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpreted section 510 more 
broadly, holding that it covers all types of internal complaints.33  The 
Second Circuit has taken a different approach, holding that employees 
who provide information after being solicited are protected under section 
510, but those who provide unsolicited information are not.34  With the 
Supreme Court’s recent refusal to address the courts’ inconsistent 
applications of section 510 protection, the circuit split remains relevant 
and highly controversial.35 
This Comment argues in favor of a broad application of section 510 
protections to unsolicited internal complaints made by participants of 
ERISA plans to their supervisors or managers.  Part II discusses the 
circumstances surrounding the enactment of ERISA, the purposes and 
objectives of the statute, and the policy concerns it seeks to address.  Part 
II also introduces two other pieces of federal legislation that contain 
antiretaliation provisions: the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)36 and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”).37  These statutes provide a 
                                                                                                             
 31 29 U.S.C. § 1141 (2006). 
 32 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2010); see also 
King v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 33 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1994); see also 
Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 34 Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 330 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 35 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S.Ct. 1604 (2011). 
 36 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
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point of comparison because they, respectively, reflect stricter and more 
lenient antiretaliation provisions than ERISA. 
Part III of this Comment addresses the current circuit split 
regarding the application of section 510 to unsolicited internal 
complaints.  This split places the Fifth and Ninth Circuits at one end of 
the spectrum and the Third and Fourth Circuits at the other end.38  The 
Second Circuit further divides the split by utilizing a different 
approach.39  Part IV provides a detailed analysis of the language used in 
the whistleblower provisions contained in ERISA, the FLSA, and Title 
VII.  Part IV also discusses the relevant case law that applies the 
antiretaliation provisions of the FLSA, Title VII, and other statutes to 
shed light on the relevant ERISA provision.  Further, Part IV examines 
the germane public policy considerations and posits how to preserve the 
congressional intent behind ERISA while maintaining the rights of 
employees. 
This Comment concludes with a summary of the conflicting 
authority and the importance of a uniform and consistent application of 
section 510.  It stresses the public policy arguments in favor of a broad 
application of the whistleblower provision, as well as the inadequacy of a 
narrow interpretation.  Ultimately, it argues that courts should extend 
security for employees as a mechanism to ensure employer compliance 
with the terms of this comprehensive piece of legislation. 
II. BACKGROUND OF ERISA AND A COMPARISON OF SECTION 510 AND 
OTHER SIMILAR WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS 
Congress enacted ERISA in response to the rapid and substantial 
increase in employee benefit plans.40  Finding that the “operational scope 
and economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate[,]” and 
because of the national interest involved, Congress endeavored to create 
adequate disclosure and enforcement minimum standards. 41   The 
resulting remedies, sanctions, and accessibility to courts gave substance 
to ERISA’s declared policy of promoting and securing employees’ 
interests.42  Congress structured ERISA’s civil enforcement mechanism 
to give several different kinds of plaintiffs standing to bring an action on 
behalf of plan participants.43  Furthermore, “ERISA also expanded the 
                                                                                                             
 38 Compare Anderson, 11 F.3d at 1315, and Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 411, with 
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223, and King, 337 F.3d 427. 
 39 See Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330. 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Richard Rouco, Available Remedies Under ERISA Section 502(a), 45 ALA. L. REV. 
631, 632 (1994). 
 43 Id. 
2011] CAN YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ANYWHERE? 165 
class of potential defendants by liberally defining the status of plan 
fiduciary.  Such an expansion sent a clear signal that Congress would no 
longer tolerate the fraudulent practices that characterized much of pre-
ERISA employee benefit law.”44 
Section 510 of ERISA prohibits employers both from 
discriminating against an employee based on eligibility for benefits and 
also from retaliating against an employee who asserts rights under 
ERISA:45 
It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, 
expel, discipline, or discriminate against a participant or 
beneficiary for exercising any right to which he is entitled under 
the provisions of an employee benefit plan [or] this title . . . or for 
the purpose of interfering with the attainment of any right to 
which such participant may become entitled under the plan [or] 
this title[.]  It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel or discriminate against any person because he has 
given information or has testified or is about to testify in any 
inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]46 
For a comprehensive analysis of section 510’s antiretaliation 
provision, it is useful to compare its language with that of analogous 
whistleblower provisions contained in previously enacted and interpreted 
legislation.  In particular, this Comment examines section 215 of the 
FLSA47 and section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.48 
The FLSA, an important component of President Roosevelt’s New 
Deal program, provides for a nationwide minimum wage and an 
overtime premium in the private market. 49   Section 215 of this Act 
prohibits employer retaliation in response to employees asserting their 
rights to minimum wage and hour standards in the workplace. 50   It 
prohibits the “discharge or in any other manner [the] discriminat[ion] 
against any employee because such employee has filed any complaint or 
instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding under or relating to 
                                                                                                             
 44 Id. 
 45 Jared Goldstein, Employment Discrimination Claims Under ERISA Section 510: 
Should Courts Require Exhaustion of Arbitral and Plan Remedies?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 
193, 194 (1994). 
 46 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 47 Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2006). 
 48 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 49 Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of The Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 328 (2005). 
 50 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006). 
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this Act . . . or has testified or is about to testify in any such 
proceeding[.]”51 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Title VII of the Act 
specifically prohibits employer retaliation against an employee who 
asserts his or her rights by alleging discrimination by the employer on the 
basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or 
disability.52  This section deems it an unlawful employment practice for 
an employer to “discriminate against any of his employees or applicants 
for employment . . . because he has opposed any practice made an 
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has 
made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”53 
Courts and scholars compare section 510 of ERISA to both of the 
whistleblower provisions described above. 54   In particular, courts 
acknowledge the difference in the language used by Congress in the 
three legislative acts, and interpret this to signify varying objectives and 
intentions. 55   As such, in the absence of an explicit Supreme Court 
holding regarding section 510’s application to unsolicited internal 
complaints, courts’ various interpretations of the FLSA and Title VII 
provide useful guidance.    
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF SECTION 510 TO UNSOLICITED 
INTERNAL COMPLAINTS 
Courts struggle with the application of section 510 to cases in 
which an aggrieved employee makes a complaint within the company 
                                                                                                             
 51 29 U.S.C. § 215 (2006). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16a (2006). 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006). 
 54 See Gavalik v. Cont’l Can Co., 812 F.2d 834, 847 (3d Cir. 1987) (agreeing with 
Judge Sarokin’s majority opinion in McLendon v. Cont’l Grp., Inc., 602 F.Supp. 1492, 
1503–04 (D.N.J. 1985), that just as Title VII prohibits discrimination in the workplace on 
the basis of one’s race, so too does ERISA’s section 510 prohibit discrimination in the 
workplace with respect to pension benefits on the basis of one’s proximity to obtaining 
such benefits); see also Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 
2010); Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325, 327–28 (2d Cir. 2005) (comparing 
section 510 of ERISA with section 215 of the FLSA, and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act); King v. Marriot Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003) (applying its 
interpretation in Ball v. Memphis Bar-B-Q Co., 228 F.3d 360, 364 (4th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that section 215 of the FLSA is more narrow than that of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 because of the use of words such as “proceeding,” “testify” and 
“institute”). 
 55 See King, 337 F.3d at 427; see also Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327–28; see also 
Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223–25. 
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alleging violations of the ERISA statute. 56   The current circuit split 
highlights the disparity between purposive and textual approaches to 
statutory interpretation—the Fifth and Ninth Circuits fall in the former 
category, and the Third and Fourth Circuits fall in the latter.  The Second 
Circuit takes a slightly different approach, affording protection to 
internal complaints that are solicited, but not to those that are unsolicited.  
“Textualism posits that courts are bound by a statute’s plain meaning, 
and that consideration of legislative history, spirit, or purpose is 
inappropriate in attempting to discern statutory meaning.”57  On the other 
hand, under the purposivist approach courts read statutory language in 
the context of the statute’s often-unarticulated purposes.58  Thus, it is 
possible “for some source, such as legislative history or apparent spirit or 
purpose, to trump the statutory text[.]”59  Utilizing these approaches in 
the context of section 510, the variation hinges on the meaning of the 
words “inquiry or proceeding.”  The former two circuits look to the 
legislative intent and read the language as encompassing all internal 
complaints, while the latter two circuits apply a strict analysis of the 
literal meaning of the words in the statute—finding that the language of 
section 510 only includes complaints or information provided during 
formal administrative or judicial proceedings. 
A.  Purposive Approach: Unsolicited Internal Complaints are Protected 
Under Section 510 of ERISA Because of Public Policy Justifications 
Both the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits have held that section 510’s 
protection against improper terminations due to reporting ERISA 
violations—either potential or actual—encompasses unsolicited internal 
complaints.  The Ninth Circuit found that public policy demands 
protection of such individuals because unsolicited internal complaints are 
the first step in providing information or testifying about a violation.60  
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit interpreted section 510 broadly and found that 
the provision includes unsolicited internal complaints within its ambit.61 
The Ninth Circuit addressed the applicability of section 510 to such 
internal complaints in Hashimoto v. Bank of Hawaii.62  In this case, the 
appellant initially brought an action against her former employer in 
                                                                                                             
 56 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 220–21. 
 57 Peter J. Smith, Textualism and Jurisdiction, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1883, 1886 
(2008). 
 58 Id. at 1898. 
 59 Id. at 1898–99. 
 60 Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 61 Anderson v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1316 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 62 Hashimoto, 999 F.2d at 408. 
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which she alleged violations of state wrongful discharge law. 63  
Appellant asserted that she voiced concerns to her supervisors several 
times between 1989 and 1990 about “potential and/or actual violations 
by the [b]ank of the reporting and disclosure requirements and fiduciary 
standards of ERISA.” 64   In response to her assertions, appellant 
maintained that the respondent improperly terminated her.65 
The court found that the case was properly before it 66  and the 
appellant had standing 67  because ERISA is clearly meant to protect 
whistleblowers. 68   Furthermore, the court acknowledged that “[t]he 
normal first step in giving information or testifying in any way that might 
tempt an employer to discharge one would be to present the problem first 
to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan.”69  If one is subsequently 
discharged for addressing the problem, then “the process of giving 
information or testifying is interrupted at its start: the anticipatory 
discharge discourages the whistle blower before the whistle is blown.”70 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in Anderson v. Electronic Data Systems 
Corp.,71 interpreted section 510 broadly, concluding that the preemption 
provision of ERISA is “deliberately expansive . . . [and] is to be 
construed extremely broadly.”72  In this case, the complaint alleged a 
request by the employer to commit illegal acts, plaintiff’s refusal to do 
so, plaintiff’s reporting of such requests to management, and his 
subsequent termination.73  While not explicitly relying on Hashimoto, the 
                                                                                                             
 63 An employer shall not discharge, threaten, or otherwise discriminate against 
an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, 
location or privileges of employment because: (1) [t]he employee, or a 
person acting on behalf of the employee, reports or is about to report to a 
public body, verbally or in writing, a violation or a suspected violation of a 
law or rule adopted pursuant to law of this [s]tate, a political subdivision of 
this [s]tate, or the United States, unless the employee knows that the report 
is false[.] 
Id. at 409 (citing Hawaii Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, H.R.S. § 378-62 (2002)). 
 64 Id. at 409. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 410.  The Ninth Circuit found that, regardless of the well-pleaded complaint 
rule, ERISA completely preempts pension plans such as the one involved in this case.  
Therefore, despite the appellant’s reliance on state law, the controlling law here is 
ERISA. 
 67 McClendon v. Hewlett-Packard Co., No. CV-05-087-S-BLW, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 43579, at *14 (D. Idaho June 9, 2005) (“The Ninth Circuit could not have 
concluded that ERISA preemption applied without the determination that the former 
employee was qualified to assert ERISA participation protection.”). 
 68 Hashimoto v. Bank of Haw., 999 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. 
 71 11 F.3d 1311 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 72 Id. at 1316 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 73 Id. at 1312–13. 
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Fifth Circuit employed similar reasoning.  The court looked to Supreme 
Court precedent, which has “consistently emphasized the expansiveness 
of the ‘relate to’ standard.”74   The “relate to” standard applies to the 
interpretation of section 502,75 which preempts state laws that relate to an 
ERISA benefit plan.  In Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that 
“a plaintiff could recover in a wrongful discharge action if he established 
that the principal reason for his termination was the employer’s desire to 
avoid contributing to or paying benefits under the employee’s pension 
fund.”76  Instead, the Supreme Court interpreted the complete preemption 
provision broadly, finding that a state law relates to an ERISA plan “if it 
has a connection with or reference to such a plan.”77  Therefore, the court 
in Anderson reasoned that section 510 likewise deserves a broad 
interpretation encompassing unsolicited internal complaints made by 
employees. 
Neither circuit undertook a detailed analysis of the literal meaning 
of the text in the statute; instead, the courts embraced an interpretation in 
light of the legislative history and public policy considerations.  
Subsequently, lower courts have followed and applied the reasoning of 
both the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.  The United States District Court for 
the District of Idaho applied Hashimoto and concluded that “an 
employee can invoke [section 510] by simply presenting the ERISA 
problem first to the responsible managers of the ERISA plan.” 78  
Similarly, the District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan held 
that “the activity protected under [s]ection 510 includes internal 
complaints made by an employee.”79   Following this reasoning, section 
510’s antiretaliation provision affords protection to an employee who 
presents unsolicited complaints to management.  Likewise, in its analysis 
of the case law on point, the District Court in the Northern District of 
Ohio summed up the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Anderson: “‘Reporting 
[ERISA] violations to management[]’ would qualify a person for the 
                                                                                                             
 74 Id. at 1316 (citation omitted). 
 75 Codified at 29 U.S.C.S. § 1144(a), this provision is referred to as “section 502” 
because it fell within part five, section 502 of the act in its original form.  See supra note 
46. 
 76 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 136 (1990) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 77 Id. at 139 (internal citations omitted). 
 78 See Momchilov v. McIlvaine Trucking, Int’l, Inc., No: 5:09CV1322, 2010 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2010) (citing Anderson v. Elec. Data 
Sys. Corp., 11 F.3d 1311, 1314 (5th Cir. 1994)). 
 79 Dunn v. Elco Enters., Inc., No. 05-71801, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *14 
(E.D. Mich. May 4, 2006); see also Momchilov, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *14–
15. 
170 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 8:159 
protections granted under ERISA [section] 510.”80  In choosing to follow 
the interpretation of the Fifth Circuit, the court held that section 510 of 
ERISA protects unsolicited internal complaints made by an employee to 
management.81 
B.  Textual Approach: Unsolicited Internal Complaints are not Protected 
Under Section 510 of ERISA Because they are not Compatible with the 
Literal Meaning of the Text 
Addressing the status of unsolicited internal complaints and their 
protection under section 510, the Fourth and Third Circuits have found 
that principles of statutory interpretation demand that the words “inquiry 
or proceeding” be afforded their literal meaning.82  This requires a formal 
administrative or judicial proceeding before the statute’s protections 
attach.83  The Fourth Circuit has held that use of the phrase “testified or 
is about to testify” in section 510 suggests that “inquiry or proceeding” is 
limited to “legal or administrative, or at least to something more formal 
than written or oral complaints made to a supervisor.”84  Similarly, the 
Third Circuit has recently interpreted section 510 narrowly, finding that 
internal complaints are not protected.85 
The Fourth Circuit first addressed the application of section 510 to 
unsolicited internal complaints in King v. Marriot International, Inc.86  
King was an employee in Marriott’s benefits department, and the 
controversy involved a proposal to transfer millions of dollars from 
Marriott’s medical plan to its general corporate reserves account.87  King 
doubted the appropriateness—and legality under ERISA—of the transfer 
and expressed her concerns to the Senior Vice President of 
Compensation and Benefits and to other coworkers. 88  Marriott 
International subsequently terminated King after she objected to the 
                                                                                                             
 80 Momchilov, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27620, at *15 (internal citation omitted); see 
also Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *11. 
 81 Dunn, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26169, at *14. 
 82 See King v. Marriot Int’l, 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003); see also Edwards v. 
A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 83 Section 510 states that: “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, 
suspend, expel, or discriminate against any person because he has given information or 
has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this [Act].”  29 
U.S.C. § 1140 (2006). 
 84 King, 337 F.3d at 427. 
 85 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225–26. 
 86 King, 337 F.3d at 421. King initiated her action in state court where she alleged a 
violation of Maryland state law as well as ERISA.  The defendants removed the case to 
federal court due to complete preemption by ERISA, and the appellant appealed the 
decision of complete preemption.  Id. at 422–23. 
 87 Id. at 423. 
 88 Id. 
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proposed transfer of funds for the third time.  Her termination was 
purportedly due to her continuing feud with a coworker, which “hindered 
the operation of the benefits department.”89 
The court focused its discussion of section 510 on the meaning of 
the phrase “inquiry or proceeding.”90  The Fourth Circuit also considered 
similar antiretaliation provisions under the FLSA and Title VII.91   It 
determined that “the use of the phrase ‘testified or is about to testify’ 
does suggest that the phrase ‘inquir[ies] or proceeding[s]’ referenced in 
section 510 is limited to the legal or administrative, or at least to 
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a 
supervisor.” 92   Furthermore, the court found that “the phrase ‘given 
information’ ensures that even the non-testimonial information (such as 
incriminating documents) in any inquiry or proceeding would also be 
covered.”93  Consequently, the court expressly disagreed with Anderson 
and Hashimoto in reaching its conclusion that the protections of section 
510 do not extend to such unsolicited, internal complaints.94 
Following similar reasoning, the Third Circuit recently entered the 
fray with its decision in Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc.  The Third 
Circuit agreed with the King court and held that “unsolicited internal 
complaints are not protected under [s]ection 510 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 
1140.”95  A.H. Cornell hired Edwards as Director of Human Resources.96  
His duties involved oversight of the company’s group health insurance 
plan, governed by ERISA, in which he was also a participant.97  When 
Edwards discovered that A.H. Cornell was engaged in several ERISA 
violations, she complained about them to management; shortly after, the 
company terminated her.98 
The court began its discussion by acknowledging the circuit split 
regarding whether section 510 protects unsolicited internal complaints.  
Next, it proceeded with statutory interpretation because “‘absent a clearly 
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must 
                                                                                                             
 89 Id. 
 90 Id. at 427. 
 91 Id. 
 92 King, 337 F.3d at 427 (internal italics omitted); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (“[i]t 
shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel or discriminate against 
any person because he has given information or has testified or is about to testify in any 
inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]”). 
 93 Id. at 427. 
 94 Id. at 428. 
 95 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis 
removed). 
 96 Id. at 218. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
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ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.’”99  The court concluded—as did 
the Fourth Circuit in King—that the use of the phrase “testified or is 
about to testify” implies that the phrase “inquiry or proceeding” is to be 
limited to more formal actions.100  The court found that “[i]n drafting 
[section 510], Congress could have used broad language similar to that 
present in the anti-retaliation provision in [Title VII].” 101   Because 
Congress declined to utilize such language, a narrow reading was 
appropriate.102  The Secretary of Labor, as amicus curiae, recommended 
that section 510 of ERISA be given a broader reading because failure to 
protect internal complaints would “undermine the provision’s purpose, as 
‘it would permit an employer to terminate an employee upon the 
employee first notifying the employer of the ERISA violation[.]’”103  The 
Third Circuit declined to give deference to the Secretary of Labor’s 
amicus brief because the Secretary “has not pointed to any regulations, 
rulings, or other material in support of its position[,]” and therefore, “we 
do not apply Chevron deference to ‘agency litigat[ion] positions that are 
wholly unsupported by regulations, ruling, or administrative 
practice[.]’”104 
The Third Circuit’s interpretation of agency deference is 
questionable at best.  While the Secretary pointed to no specific 
regulation,105 the Secretary stressed that the agency’s practice depends 
upon a broad reading of the whistleblower provisions’ protections.106  It 
is true that deference is not due when the agency’s position is 
unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative practice; 107  but 
here, the Secretary clearly pointed to relevant administrative practices.  
As the Supreme Court held in Chevron, “a court may not substitute its 
                                                                                                             
 99 Id. at 222 (internal citation omitted). 
 100 Id. at 223. 
 101 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 223. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Id. at 224 (quoting Appellant Brief ¶ 14, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 
F.3d 217, 224 (2010)). 
 104 Id. at 225 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).  The court’s reference to 
Chevron deference relates to the Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (holding that where Congress implicitly grants 
legislative delegation to an agency, the court shall not disturb the agency’s interpretation 
of a statutory provision). Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 105 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225. 
 106 Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus Curiae in Supp. of Appellant for 
Reversal 30–31, Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 107 Edwards, 610 F.3d at 225 (citing Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 
204, 212 (1988)). 
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own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency.”108 
C.  A Third Approach: While Unsolicited Internal Complaints are 
Unprotected Under Section 510, Solicited Internal Complaints Find 
Shelter Within the Provision. 
With its decision in Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc. in 2005, the 
Second Circuit entered the debate.109  Horizon hired Nicolaou as the 
Director of Human Resources and Administration in July 1998.110  In her 
capacity as the fiduciary and trustee, she oversaw the implementation of 
Horizon’s 401(k) employee benefits plan as regulated by ERISA. 111  She 
was also a plan participant. 112   Shortly after her employment began, 
Nicolaou discovered “a serious payroll discrepancy involving 
underpayment of overtime to all non-exempt employees of the New York 
City and Los Angeles offices.”113  Because of the length of time that the 
discrepancy had persisted, the complaint alleged that it was “a historical 
under funding of Horizon’s 401(k) plan.”114 
Upon notification of the problem, Horizon’s Chief Financial 
Officer, Jerry Riley, advised Nicolaou to disregard the matter. 115  
Nicolaou also raised the issue with Horizon’s Controller on two 
occasions and encountered the same indifference. 116  Convinced that 
Horizon refused to rectify the discrepancy, Nicolaou brought it to the 
attention of Mark Silverman, Horizon’s general counsel.  Mr. Silverman 
conducted his own investigation and subsequently verified Nicolaou’s 
findings.117 
At a meeting in November of 1999, Nicolaou and Silverman 
informed Horizon’s President, William Koenigsberg, of the payroll 
problem.118  Koenigsberg appeared “disturbed . . .  and not at all pleased 
that this issue was being brought to his attention.”119  Within days of this 
meeting with Koenigsberg, the company first replaced Nicolaou’s 
                                                                                                             
 108 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. 
 109 Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 110 Id. at 326. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 114 Id. at 326 (internal citations omitted). 
 115 Nicolaou, 401 F.3d at 326. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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Human Resources position with another employee and then terminated 
Nicolaou.120 
In its discussion, the Second Circuit compared section 510 of 
ERISA to the analogous whistleblower provisions of the FLSA and Title 
VII. 121   It found that the antiretaliation provision of ERISA is 
“unambiguously broader in scope than [s]ection 15(a)(3) of FLSA.”122  
First, the Second Circuit—in comparing the language of both the 
FLSA 123  and ERISA 124  whistleblower provisions—agreed with the 
Secretary of Labor that “whatever level of formality is implied by the 
term “proceeding”’ in FLSA, the use of the somewhat less formal term 
“inquiry” in ERISA is indicative of an intent ‘to ensure protection for 
those involved in the informal gathering of information.’”125  Thus, the 
term “inquiry” is broad enough to include any request for information.126  
The court held that the lower court erred in its decision that Nicolaou’s 
allegations do not fall within the meaning of the term “inquiry or 
proceeding” as a matter of law.127  While the meeting with Koenigsberg 
was “something less than a formal proceeding,” it was sufficient to 
constitute an inquiry under section 510, as long as Nicolaou could show 
she was solicited for the meeting.128 
In so holding, the Second Circuit did not find its conclusion to be in 
conflict with King, which held that “inquiry or proceeding” as used in 
section 510 applies only to “‘the legal or administrative, or at least . . . 
something more formal than written or oral complaints made to a 
supervisor.’”129  The Court in Nicolaou believed that the “proper focus is 
not on the formality or informality of the circumstances under which an 
individual gives information, but rather on whether the circumstances 
                                                                                                             
 120 Id. at 326–27. 
 121 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 327–28. 
 122 Id. at 328 (emphasis removed). 
 123 [T]o discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any employee 
because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be 
instituted any proceeding under or related to this Act . . . or has testified or is 
about to testify in any such proceeding, or has served or is about to serve on 
an industry committee. 
29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 124 “It shall be unlawful for any person to discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or 
discriminate against any person because he has given information or has testified or is 
about to testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]”  29 U.S.C. § 1140 
(2010) (emphasis added). 
 125 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 328–29 (quoting Brief for the Secretary of Labor as Amicus 
Curiae 18, Nicolaou v. Horizon Media, Inc., 402 F.3d 325 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 126 Id. at 329. 
 127 Id. at 330. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. (quoting King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 427 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
2011] CAN YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ANYWHERE? 175 
can fairly be deemed to constitute an ‘inquiry.’”130   The court rejected 
the Fourth Circuit’s blanket denial of all section 510 protection, unless in 
the presence of a formal legal or administrative proceeding.131  Instead, 
the Second Circuit determined that if the employer affirmatively seeks 
information regarding a statutory violation, and the employee responds to 
such a request, then the employee’s response is protected under section 
510.132  Despite declining to extend this conclusion to unsolicited internal 
complaints, the Second Circuit did not see its decision as conflicting with 
the holding in King.133 
The Second Circuit’s line of reasoning develops a third branch in 
the circuit split.  Much disagreement has resulted over how to interpret 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou.  The Third Circuit 
undoubtedly viewed the Second Circuit as being in agreement with the 
Fourth Circuit, regarding the debate over whether section 510 
encompasses unsolicited internal complaints.134  Both the Eastern and 
Southern Districts of New York, however, interpreted the Second 
Circuit’s holding in Nicolaou to permit less formal complaints—such as 
complaints made to management—to constitute an “inquiry” under 
section 510.135 
IV. RESOLUTION OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: PRESERVING CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT AND THE RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEES IN THE WORKPLACE TO 
MONITOR THE MAINTENANCE OF THEIR PENSION PLANS 
Due to the expressed legislative intent, relevant public policy 
considerations, and the uniqueness of ERISA’s complete preemption 
provision, the current circuit split should be resolved in favor of allowing 
protection under section 510 for unsolicited internal complaints.  In the 
midst of an economic recession, can employees approaching their 
retirement years have security in their knowledge that they have been 
accumulating wealth through their employer-provided and federally 
regulated pension plans?  As a society, citizens are encouraged to 
understand the law of the land, to educate themselves, and—if need be—
to monitor employer actions ensuring compliance with the law.  To 
punish a proactive employee who properly seeks to ensure compliance 
with federal laws flagrantly disregards these principles.  Particularly in 
                                                                                                             
 130 Id. 
 131 Nicolaou, 402 F.3d at 330. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 220–22 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 135 Higueros v. Catholic Health Plan, 526 F. Supp. 2d 342, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see 
also Ello v. Singh, 531 F. Supp. 2d 552, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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light of ERISA’s unique complete preemption provision 136 —which 
ensures that federal law preempts any dispute encroaching upon the 
policy behind ERISA—courts should closely monitor the judicial relief 
available to disgruntled workers in order to ensure uniformity and 
consistency. 
When predicting how the Supreme Court would rule on this circuit 
split, it is appropriate to examine where the current Justices fall in the 
textualist/purposivist debate.  Justices Scalia and Thomas are self-
professed textualists.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito and Justice 
Kennedy likely also fall in this category.137  On the other side of the 
debate one could expect to find the liberal justices, such as Justices 
Ginsburg and Breyer, and one would assume the new Justices Sotomayor 
and Kagan.138  While this ideological division suggests that the Court’s 
majority would follow the textualist approach, the positions of Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito are debatable. 139   In various cases, 
                                                                                                             
 136 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
 137 Smith, supra note 57, at 14.  There are some indications that Justice Alito considers 
himself a textualist.  See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 334–
35 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the meaning of “a strong inference” of 
scienter under Private Securities Litigation Reform Act); see also BP Am. Prod. Co. v. 
Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91–92 (2006) (relying on “ordinary meaning” of the statutory text); 
see also Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an 
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 350 (2006) (“When I interpret statutes . . . where I 
start and often where I end is with the text of the statute.”).  Alternatively, there is 
evidence that he does not consider himself a textualist.  For example, he joined Justice 
Souter’s arguably nontextualist partial dissent in Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 492 
(2007) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If I could not go beyond 
statutory text . . . a coin toss would be my only way to judgment. But I look to 
congressional purpose . . . .”), and in Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 
U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting), he declined to join Justice Scalia’s textualist 
dissent. As for Chief Justice Roberts, it is also unclear whether he considers himself a 
textualist, see, e.g., Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to 
Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
109th Cong. 319–20 (2005) (indicating some willingness to consider legislative history in 
certain circumstances), but he generally joins opinions by the Court’s textualists, see, 
e.g., Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Servs., Inc., 551 U.S. 224 (2007) (Scalia, J., joined 
by Roberts, C.J.); Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Roberts, C.J.); 
Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 328 (2007) (Thomas, J., joined by Roberts, C.J.). 
 138 See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 
120 (2008) (classifying Justices Ginsburg and Breyer as liberals for the purposes of their 
investigation); see also Brandon J. Almas, From One [Expletive] Policy to the Next: The 
FCC’s Regulation of “Fleeting Expletives” and the Supreme Court’s Response, 63 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 261, 282 (2010) (acknowledging that while it is assumed that Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan will vote liberally—because they replaced liberal Justices Souter 
and Stevens, respectively—their voting history is not reliable). 
 139 Smith, supra note 57, at 14. 
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Justice Alito has declined to join the textualists.140  Similarly, in Chief 
Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearing, he stated a willingness to 
consider legislative history in certain instances.141  Even assuming that 
Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts fall into the textualist group, 
when evaluating the text of the ERISA statute as a whole and considering 
how the complete preemption provision effectively eliminates a state law 
remedy, these Justices could find that the text of the statute supports an 
inference that all employee complaints should be protected. 
A.  ERISA’s Complete Preemption Provision is Unique in Comparison 
with the FLSA and Title VII Statutes. 
Both FLSA and Title VII have their own enforcement mechanisms, 
but neither statute calls for complete preemption in the field by the 
federal courts.  The Fair Labor Standards Act permits an aggrieved 
worker to seek a judicial remedy at the federal, state, or local levels.142  
Furthermore, section 218c(b)(2) of the statute provides that: “[n]othing in 
this section shall be deemed to diminish the rights, privileges, or 
remedies of any employee under any Federal or State law or under any 
collective bargaining agreement. The rights and remedies in this section 
may not be waived by any agreement, policy, form, or condition of 
employment.”143 
Similarly, Title VII does not preempt state and local laws and 
regulations regarding workplace discrimination, but rather supplements 
                                                                                                             
 140 See Limtiaco, 549 U.S. at 492 (where Justice Alito joined Justice Souter’s 
nontextualist partial dissent); see also Zuni, 550 U.S. at 107 (where Justice Alito declined 
to join Justice Scalia’s textualist dissent). 
 141 See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief 
Justice of the United States supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 142 Under 29 U.S.C. § 218(a) (2006) of FLSA, Congress explicitly established: 
No provision of this chapter or of any order thereunder shall excuse 
noncompliance with any [f]ederal or [s]tate law or municipal ordinance 
establishing a minimum wage higher than the minimum wage established 
under this chapter or a maximum work week lower than the maximum 
workweek established under this chapter, and no provision of this chapter 
relating to the employment of child labor shall justify noncompliance with 
any [f]ederal or [s]tate law or municipal ordinance establishing a higher 
standard than the standard established under this chapter. No provision of 
this chapter shall justify any employer in reducing a wage paid by him, 
which is in excess of the applicable minimum wage under this chapter, or 
justify any employer in increasing hours of employment maintained by him, 
which are shorter than the maximum hours applicable under this chapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 218(a). 
 143 29 U.S.C. § 218c(b)(2) (2006).  See Ervin v. OS Restaurant Services, Inc., 632 
F.3d 971, 977 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding that the language of § 218(a) effectively preserves 
state and local regulation). 
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them. 144   Indeed, section 2000e-7, in discussing the effect of the 
subchapter on state laws, notes that they maintain their authority. 145  
More specifically, Congress explicitly states that it does not seek to 
preempt state law in the field of discrimination in the workplace on the 
basis of the employee’s race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or 
disability.146 
ERISA section 510 is different from the analogous antiretaliation 
provisions of the FLSA and Title VII because it operates under the 
doctrine of federal preemption.  In practice, this doctrine invalidates all 
state law claims.  As such, if an employee is denied protection under the 
ERISA whistleblower provision, he or she is prevented from obtaining 
relief.  A state law claim is preempted under ERISA when it “relates to” 
an ERISA benefit plan.147  “A law ‘relates to’ an employee benefit plan, 
in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference 
to such a plan.”148  Keeping this controlling doctrine in mind emphasizes 
the dangers of adhering to the textualist approach because narrowly 
construing the statute would undoubtedly leave many employees without 
a remedy at federal or state law. 
                                                                                                             
 144 See Cal. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(“Title VII does not itself prevent [s]tates from extending their nondiscrimination laws to 
areas not covered by Title VII.”); see also Wymer v. N.Y. State Div. for Youth, 671 
F.Supp. 210, 213 (W.D.N.Y. 1987) (stating that “Title VII was designed to supplement 
rather than supplant existing laws and institutions relating to employment 
discrimination.”). 
 145 The relevant statutory text of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7 (2006) is: 
Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to exempt or relieve any person 
from any liability, duty, penalty, or punishment provided by any present or 
future law of any [s]tate or political subdivision of a [s]tate, other than any 
such law which purports to require or permit the doing of any act which 
would be an unlawful employment practice under this subchapter. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-7. 
 146 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4 (2006): 
Nothing contained in any title of this Act shall be construed as indicating an 
intent on the part of Congress to occupy the field in which any such title 
operates to the exclusion of [s]tate laws on the same subject matter, nor shall 
any provision of this Act be construed as invalidating any provision of 
[s]tate law unless such provision is inconsistent with any of the purposes of 
this Act, or any provision thereof. 
42 U.S.C. § 2000h-4. 
 147 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 139 (1990) (citing Shaw v. Delta 
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96–97 (1983)). 
 148 Id. 
2011] CAN YOU BLOW THE WHISTLE ANYWHERE? 179 
B.  Legislative Intent and Public Policy Justifications Demand a Broader 
Interpretation of Section 510 than that Established in the Third and 
Fourth Circuits’ Jurisprudence. 
ERISA is a remedial statute and as such, should be liberally 
construed in favor of protecting the employee.149  One of Congress’s 
central objectives in enacting the complex legislation was to promote the 
interests of employees and their beneficiaries.150  In addition, Congress 
included various safeguards for the purpose of deterring abuse and 
“completely secur[ing] the rights and expectations brought into being by 
[ERISA.]”151  Specifically, Senate Report 93-127 clearly indicates that 
the committee added section 510 because of “evidence that in some plans 
a worker’s pension rights or the expectations of those rights were 
interfered with by the use of economic sanctions or violent reprisals.”152  
The Committee concluded that safeguards are “required to preclude this 
type of abuse from being carried out and in order to completely secure 
the rights and expectations brought into being by this landmark reform 
legislation.”153  With regard to its inclusion of the section 510 safeguards, 
the Committee’s stated intention was “to provide the full range of legal 
and equitable remedies available in both state and federal courts and to 
remove jurisdictional and procedural obstacles which in the past appear 
to have hampered effective enforcement of fiduciary 
responsibilities[.]”154  As such, the antiretaliation provision of ERISA 
plays a fundamental role in the proper implementation of the entire 
statutory scheme because it helps to make ERISA’s assurances 
credible. 155   Recognizing the purposes underlying ERISA, it is 
counterintuitive that Congress would exclude employees who are 
discharged for bringing an ERISA-related concern to the attention of 
their manager or supervisor from the protection of the remedial 
antiretaliation provision.156   It is also beneficial to employers to have the 
statute read broadly, as it permits them to rectify any violations before 
being the subject of a formal administrative investigation or disciplinary 
actions. 
                                                                                                             
 149 IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Baker & Williamson, Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 127 (3d 
Cir. 1986). 
 150 Shaw, 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983). 
 151 Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 137. 
 152 See supra note 4, at 35. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 34. 
 155 Inter-Modal Rail Emps. Ass’n v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 520 U.S. 
510, 515 (1997). 
 156 Edwards v. A.H. Cornell & Son, Inc., 610 F.3d 217, 227 (3d Cir. 2010) (Cowen, J., 
dissenting). 
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In addition to recognizing important policy rationales for 
interpreting section 510 to include unsolicited internal complaints, it is 
also useful to compare the language of the ERISA antiretaliation 
provision with analogous whistleblower provisions of other federal 
statutes.  Despite the vast majority of available federal statutes that 
contain antiretaliation provisions, 157  this Comment compares the 
whistleblower provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act158 and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.159   These two statutes are appropriate points of 
comparison because they respectively contain anti-retaliation provisions 
that are narrower and broader than that within section 510; thus, they 
offer the opportunity for a more expansive analysis. 
The antiretaliation provision that is central to the FLSA prohibits 
the “discharge or in any other manner [the] discriminat[ion] against any 
employee because such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or 
caused to be instituted any proceeding under or relating to this Act . . . or 
has testified or is about to testify in any such proceeding[.]”160  There is 
currently a circuit split regarding the protection afforded by this section 
to internal complaints.  The Eighth, Tenth, Eleventh, Sixth, Ninth, First 
and Fifth Circuits have all held that internal complaints are protected 
under the whistleblower provision of the FLSA. 161  The minority view, 
adopted by the Second and Fourth Circuits, holds that internal 
complaints are not protected under section 215.162  The Seventh Circuit 
recently interpreted section 215 to protect against retaliation for internal 
written complaints, but not internal oral complaints.163  The United States 
Supreme Court, however, vacated this decision on March 22, 2011.164  
The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split over whether the 
                                                                                                             
 157 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 
28 U.S.C. (2006); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) 
(2006); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006); American with Disabilities Act of 
1990, 42 U.S.C § 12203 (2006). 
 158 29 U.S.C.S. § 215 (2006). 
 159 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000e-3 (2006). 
 160 29 U.S.C.S. § 215 (2006). 
 161 See Brennan v. Maxey’s Yamaha, Inc., 513 F.2d 179, 181 (8th Cir. 1975); Love v. 
RE/MAX of Am., Inc., 738 F.2d 383, 387 (10th Cir. 1984); E.E.O.C. v. White & Sons 
Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1989); EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 
985, 989 (6th Cir. 1992); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1004 (9th Cir. 1999) (en 
banc); Valerio v. Putnam Assocs. Inc., 173 F.3d 35, 41 (1st Cir. 1999); Hagan v. Echostar 
Satellite, LLC, 529 F.3d 617, 626 (5th Cir. 2008), respectively. 
 162 See Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 1993) and Ball v. Memphis 
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phrase “filed a complaint” in section 215, includes oral as well as written 
complaints.165  Finding the language of the statute to be ambiguous, the 
Court relied on “the provision in conjunction with the purpose and 
context” to conclude that oral complaints are protected within the 
statutory provision.166  Despite this clarification, the Court declined to 
address whether such a complaint must be made to a government agency, 
or could be made internally to the employer.167 
The FLSA system relies on information and complaints from 
employees in order to secure compliance rather than requiring detailed 
and continuous government supervision.168  Section 215 of the FLSA 
prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] or in any other manner 
discriminat[ing] against any employee because such employee has filed 
any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding 
under or relating to this Act[.]”169  The Supreme Court has made clear 
that “the key to interpreting the anti-retaliation provision is the need to 
prevent employees’ ‘fear of economic retaliation’ for voicing grievances 
about substandard conditions.” 170   As such, the FLSA whistleblower 
provision is among the statutory provisions that have been expansively 
construed to provide broad protective coverage to internal 
complainants.171 
Consistent with the majority of circuits regarding the FLSA 
whistleblower provision, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act also extends to 
internal complaints. 172  The relevant statutory language of Title VII 
declares it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to 
“discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment 
. . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
practice by this title, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted 
or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing 
under this title.” 173   This language is broad enough to include most 
employee self-help actions.  It declares it unlawful for an employer to 
discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because 
that person “opposed any practice made an unlawful employment 
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practice by this title[.]” 174   In broadly construing the provision’s 
protections, the term “employees” under section 704(a) extends to former 
employees,175 and bars retaliation in response to an employee having 
filed charges against a former employer.176 
Interpreting a similar antiretaliation provision in the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, the Second Circuit has found that “Congress 
sought to protect a wide range of activity in addition to the filing of a 
formal complaint.”177 Although referring to the ADA, the Second Circuit 
relied on the same reasoning to interpret Title VII’s antiretaliation 
provision because of the similar statutory language. 178   Comparing 
various federal statutory antiretaliation provisions and their 
interpretations supports a broader reading of section 510, especially 
considering the complete preemption doctrine.  When enacting the 
statute, Congress gave private parties a means of enforcing it, but at the 
same time, subjected its provisions to complete preemption.  It would be 
illogical to deny certain employees protection, leaving them without a 
remedy. 
The Third Circuit, interpreting the Clean Water Act—which 
contains language similar to that of section 510—concluded that the 
word “proceeding” is ambiguous because its permissive applications can 
encompass both formal and informal complaints.179  In so holding, the 
court recognized an important public policy consideration that employees 
should not be discouraged from “pursuing internal remedies before going 
public with their good faith allegations.”180  Instead, employees should be 
encouraged to “notify management of their observations before any 
formal investigations and litigation are initiated,” thereby providing 
management with the opportunity to correct, justify, or clarify policies or 
otherwise “facilitate prompt voluntary remediation and compliance.”181  
Imposing a standard that denies protections to employees who report 
either potential or actual violations of ERISA to management would chill 
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employee initiatives in recognizing “discrepancies in the workings of 
their agency.”182 
The language used in section 510 of ERISA is similarly ambiguous.  
The provision prohibits any person from “discharg[ing], fin[ing], 
suspend[ing], expel[ing], disciplin[ing], or discriminat[ing] against any 
person because he has given information or has testified or is about to 
testify in any inquiry or proceeding relating to this Act[.]”183  As the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare concluded: “the safeguarding 
effect of the fiduciary responsibility section [of ERISA] will operate 
efficiently only if fiduciaries are aware that the details of their dealings 
will be open to inspection, and that individual participants and 
beneficiaries will be armed with enough information to enforce their own 
rights[.]” 184   In light of this purpose and important public policy 
considerations, the interpretation of section 510 by the Fifth and Ninth 
Circuits must be followed.  Subsequently, as the conflicting holdings of 
the circuits have resulted in a nonuniform application of federal law, 
there is a compelling reason for the Supreme Court to correct the 
conflict. 
The Fifth Circuit has recognized section 510’s broad prohibition of 
the termination or otherwise adverse treatment of employees who 
exercise their ERISA rights or give information or testimony relating to 
ERISA.185  Likewise, the Ninth Circuit has held that section 510, “is 
clearly meant to protect whistle blowers.”186 These circuits recognize the 
ambiguity of the language used in section 510, and as a proper step in 
statutory interpretation, they next turn to legislative intent.  Support for a 
broad reading of section 510 can be found in the Senate Report from the 
Committee on Labor and Public Welfare.187 
Alternatively, the Fourth Circuit’s finding that section 510’s use of 
the words “inquiry or proceeding” connotes a narrow interpretation188 
and fails to afford the protection to employees that the Committee had in 
mind.  The Fourth Circuit also draws a parallel between the use of the 
phrase “testified or is about to testify” to suggest that the language 
“inquiry or proceeding” is limited to the legal or administrative realm 
and that mere written or oral complaints to a manager are not within its 
ambit.189  The Fourth Circuit stands alone in this proposition, as even the 
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Second Circuit—which relied heavily on the Fourth Circuit precedent in 
its interpretation of section 510—refuses to draw the same parallel.190  It 
is unquestionable that the language in section 510 is broader in scope 
than that of section 215 of the FLSA.  Section 510 uses the phrase “given 
information or has testified or is about to testify in any inquiry or 
proceeding[,]”191 while section 215 uses the phrase “filed any complaint 
or instituted or caused to be instituted any proceeding[.]”192  Filing a 
complaint or instituting a proceeding are narrower courses of conduct 
than merely giving information. 
The Second Circuit, in finding that solicited internal complaints are 
protected, determined that “proceeding” refers to the progression of a 
lawsuit in an official and formal capacity, while “inquiry” refers broadly 
to any request for information. 193   This interpretation, however, is 
unworkable in some circumstances.  For instance, where would one draw 
the line between an unprotected initial step and a protected inquiry?  
Judge Cowen addressed this question in his dissenting opinion in 
Edwards: 
[S]uppose an employee like Edwards complains to her superior, 
the superior asks some follow-up questions, and the employee 
responds to these questions.  Are the informal responses to some 
impromptu questions to be regarded as protected because they 
evidently were made as part of an “inquiry?” In turn, why should 
such responses be protected while, at the same time, an employer 
is essentially permitted (and perhaps, in essence, encouraged) to 
fire an employee immediately after she makes an informal 
complaint instead of conducting an investigation of some sort? 194 
Such a result is unworkable and clearly arbitrary. 
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It appears that the circuit split in this instance is motivated by the 
courts’ prior holdings regarding the whistleblower provision in the 
FLSA. 195   The majority of circuits hold that unsolicited internal 
complaints are protected under the FLSA, and the same result will likely 
ensue regarding ERISA’s whistleblower provision once more circuits are 
exposed to the conflict.  Statutory interpretation requires that when the 
language used by the legislature is ambiguous—which is clearly the case 
with respect to section 510—courts should look to the legislative intent 
underlying the Act.  As expressed in the Senate Report predating 
ERISA’s enactment, scholarly articles, and the Secretary of Labor’s 
interpretation, section 510 was enacted to protect employees and to 
proscribe interference with the attainment of their rights.196  As such, to 
promote compliance with the law and to give employers the opportunity 
to correct potential deficiencies in their enforcement of ERISA, the 
courts should not silence employees who are exposed to actual or 
potential violations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The unprecedented reliance of nearly 124 million 197  American 
laborers on their retirement plans demands consistency and uniformity in 
regulation.  Congress enacted ERISA in response to the rapid growth in 
plan participants, the need to confront noncompliance by employers, and 
the resulting underfunding of employee benefit plans. 198   ERISA 
demands that employers adhere to reporting and disclosure rules and 
consequently endows the Secretary of Labor with the authority to ensure 
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such compliance.  It is likely, however, that only those people most 
interested—the participants themselves—would recognize those 
clandestine violations.  If such employees are threatened with the 
prospect of wrongful discharge for voicing concerns over violations of 
the law, they will be silenced and employers will have little incentive to 
correct such problems. 
The current circuit split regarding the application of section 510 of 
ERISA to unsolicited internal complaints reflects a lack of uniformity.  
Ironically, a statute that demands complete preemption so as to maintain 
consistency and uniformity in its application has in practice produced 
variations in interpretations and a conflict among the circuits.  As such, 
in order to incentivize employer compliance with the terms of ERISA, 
employees should be free to voice concerns over potential violations 
without fear of retaliatory discharge.  Invoking a broader realm of 
protection for section 510 would also benefit employers who would be 
able to address potential or actual violations of ERISA before becoming 
the subject of formal investigations or disciplinary actions. 
A comparison of the text in section 510 with analogous 
antiretaliation provisions as well as the case law interpreting such other 
statutes demands an extensive application of protection to plan 
participants.  Similar to the FLSA section 215, section 510 implicates a 
standard somewhat more formal than mere “opposition” as such word is 
used in Title VII.  Notably, a majority of courts agree that section 215 of 
the FLSA provides protection for unsolicited internal complaints.  
Moreover, it is unquestionable that the ERISA anti-retaliation provision 
is drafted more broadly than that of the FLSA.  If section 215 is to be 
extended to unsolicited internal complaints, so too should section 510. 
Further support for such protection of unsolicited internal 
complaints can be found in the legislative intent and the purpose behind 
the promulgation of ERISA.  Congress, compelled by various incidents 
of misconduct by employers regarding pension plans, enacted ERISA to 
provide protection and security to the nation’s laborers. 199   As the 
Secretary of Labor—the individual given the authority to assure 
compliance and adherence to the minimum standards set forth to protect 
private employee benefits plans—expressed as amicus in Edwards, 
regarding interpretation of section 510, protection should be extended 
broadly to employees to effectuate a check on employer compliance.200 
With the substandard conditions facing Congress at the time of 
enactment—specifically, the lack of employer compliance, resulting in 
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plan underfunding201—as well as public policy concerns that demand 
protection for the nation’s workers in the wake of their old age, there can 
be no other appropriate interpretation of section 510 other than one that 
affords employees protection should they attempt to report an actual or 
potentially illegal act.  The language used by Congress should be 
afforded its plain meaning; however, where language is ambiguous, 
Congressional intent should next be considered.  In the case of section 
510, and the various terms used by Congress in other antiretaliation 
provisions, the language is quite ambiguous.  As such, legislative intent 
should be considered, and in the case of section 510, Congress intended 
for its protections to be expansive. 202   Furthermore, public policy 
demands such an inclusive application. 
As a nation founded upon a strong incentive to work, employees 
should be encouraged to monitor their rights in the workplace.  It is 
incomprehensible to permit employer evasion from federal law and to 
deny protection to the people such evasion harms.  Congress, the 
representatives of the people, could not have intended such a 
counterintuitive result.  Employees providing unsolicited internal 
complaints to management about actual or potential violations of ERISA 
should be afforded protection from wrongful discharge in order to 
effectuate the legislative intent and protect the rights of the nation’s 
citizens. 
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